Published opinion, 22 April 2026 · source · PDF · 12 pages
J. This matter is the latest to lengthen a recent series of cases requiring us to address the submission of fabricated law to the court. Doiban v.
1 For the reasons that follow, we exercise our authority under ORAP 1.40 and ORCP 17 to sanction the attorneys for appellant by requiring them to pay the $8,044.25 in attorney fees incurred by respondent in responding to the brief containing the fabricated authority and in responding to the court’s show cause order addressing the fabricated authority.
The motion did not provide any further explanation of what had led to the need for correction, or why the court should permit the unusual relief of allowing an appellant to file a new brief after a responsive brief had been filed. 1 In the previous cases involving the submission of fabricated law, we have not considered attorney fees as a sanction either because of the self-represented status of the party burdened by the opposing party’s use of fabricated law (a self- represented party is not eligible to recover attorney fees), or because the opposing party did not request attorney fees. 508 Williams v.
Honl On review of the motion, the brief on file, and respondent’s answering brief, the court, through the Chief Judge, determined that the brief on file “contain[ed] fabricated quotations and propositions of law falsely attributed to existing cases.” The court further determined that respondent had been prejudiced by having to respond to a brief with fabricated authority, and that the proposed amended brief appeared to be substantially rewritten in a way that would prejudice respondent by requiring respondent to address a new brief.
With respect to the fees for the brief, respondent noted that the “amount is more than it would have been if fabricated quotes and incorrect propositions of law had not Cite as 348 Or App 505 (2026) 509 been included in Appellant’s opening brief” because the inclusion of those things “result in billable time devoted to searching for the nonexistent quotations, re-reading and re-evaluating cases searching for the incorrectly stated propositions of law, and additional research to confirm Respondent’s understanding of the relevant law.” Respondent “acknowledged that this would be a difficult result for Appellant, but given the options before the Court, an option that does not prejudice the […]
Documenting the role that generative artificial intelligence plays in the fabrication of law better equips us, 510 Williams v. Honl as a profession, to evaluate whether the benefits of using a technology that fabricates legal authority substantially outweigh the significant risks.2 We also decline to dismiss the appeal. There is no indication that appellant herself played a role in encouraging the use of the fabricated authority and we are not persuaded that appellant herself should bear the consequences of her attorney’s reliance on generative artificial intelligence lacking adequate safeguards.
Farris , ___ F4th ___, 2026 WL 915082, *3 (6th Cir 2026) (“That Howe’s briefs cited real legal authorities—as opposed to ‘hallucinations’ featuring fictitious cases—does not absolve him. gHowe’s failure to verify the artificial-intelligence output still resulted in the submission of false quotations and misleading legal arguments to this Court.” (citation omitted)).
The problems permeated the brief. Six of the nine cases cited in the opening brief were cited either for nonexistent quotations or propositions of law not plausibly attributable to them. Redressing the problem will require appellant to submit a substantially rewritten brief.